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Article 5

AN ANALYSIS OF THE PRESENT LEGAL STATUS
OF THE COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
AGREEMENT
Of the multitudinous provisions of the National Industrial
Recovery Act I perhaps none is destined to have such a farreaching effect as the famous Section 7-A. That clause provides, among other things,
"... that employees shall have the right to organize and bargain
collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and shall
,be free from the interference, restraint, or coercion of employers of
labor, or their agents in the designation of such representatives or in
self-organization or in other concerted activities for the purpose of
collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection..

There can be little doubt about the proposition that the
clause has made the industrial world "collective bargaining
conscious." The Act has given men in the so-called open shop
industries the courage to unionize. And with the union organization of these employees comes collective bargaining
as an automatic and inevitable concomitant which in turn
gives rise to much dispute and litigation over the enforcement of the collective agreements. Although the Act has
provided the compulsion and the basis for the negotiation of
collective bargaining agreements it leaves the matter of
their enforceability in a rather nebulous state. At the hearings on the bill it was objected by Sentaor Couzens that
the labor provisions of the Act are wholly one-sided in that
labor is protected but not restrained. The Senator queried
the Committee as to the enforcement of the obligations assumed by labor: 2
". .. and assume that the workers bargain with the cement industry and, based on the conclusion of this agreement, which the industry agrees to, the cement industry took a lot of contracts for public
work, and after it had been running on for two or three months, as
1 48 STAT. 195,15 U. S. C. A. § 702 (1933).
2 Hearings Before Senate Committee on Finance, May 22-June 1, 1933, p.
30. See FEDER. TADE AWDINDusTmR SERVICE § 5902.
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the case might be, those workers who entered into the collective bargaining decided they wanted more wages. What procedure would be
taken under the act?"
Mr. Richberg replied:
"It would depend possibly upon the method by which they organized their collective bargaining. If they followed such procedure as
we have in the railroad industry, they would apply for a change of
contract and there would be conferences and consultations over it,
and it might be that the Government would aid in bringing the parties
to an understanding."

Senator Couzens:
"Might not that be too late? If the manufacturer of cement makes
a contract to sell a million barrels of cement and he bases his contract on an agreement he has made with labor, and he furnishes

200,000 or 300,000 barrels, and he has 700,000 or 800,000 barrels to
deliver, and going on, based on the collective bargaining, what happens if labor changes its mind and wants more pay?"

That question remains largely unanswered. Some authorities have interpreted the Act to mean that the enforcement
should develop upon the Code administration.' In the main,
however, the underlying question of the legal status of a collective bargaining agreement is unsettled. Although the language of the Act is not new,4 still it does little to clarify an
old situation; and it even renders it a bit more involved by
the addition of further technicalities. The Act itself has not
changed, it seems, the legal status of the collective bargaining agreement. It satisfies itself with merely setting forth in
affirmative style that employees shall have the right to bargain collectively with their employer. For the validity and
enforceability of such agreements, one must look to the judicial decisions before the passage of the National Industrial
AmENDED CODE OF FAiR COMPETITION FOR THE COAT AND SuIT INArt. V, § 11; FEDERAL TRADE AND INDUSTRY SERVICE § 12091, which incorporates such collective bargaining agreements into the Code and enforces
them as such; 47 HARv. L. REv. 118.
4 The first provision is copied verbatim from the statement of policy in the
Norris-LaGuardia (anti-injunction) Act (47 STAT. 70, 29 U. S. C. A. SurP. VI,
§ 102 (1932)); and it resembles section 2 of the Railway Labor Act of 1926
3

See

DUSTRY,

(44 STAT. 577, 45 U. S. C. A. §§ 151-63 (1926)). See statement by President
Green, FEDERAL TRADE AND INDUSTRY SERVICE § 5602. See, also, 47 HARv. L.
REv. 118.
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Recovery Act. The attitude that the courts took toward such
agreements in the past is destined to be reemphasized with
m14ch force and vigor in the future decisions, in view of the
statutory pertinence of the subject in the modern industrial
world. It is with this purpose in mind, that a cursory examination is here attempted that it might be better understood
as to just what is the present legal status of the collective
bargaining agreement about which we have all heard so
much since the National Industrial Recovery Act was put
on the statute books.
From the early days of the law there has been much consternation over the status and validity of that "hybrid contract" called a "collective bargaining agreement." A great
bit of the perplexity arose out of the inchoate contractual
nature of the agreements. The early judges saw that they
were made between the employer and the employees' union
but that they were obviously not a contract of employment,5
and, consequently, were of no practical value at all to either
party unless the individual workers contemplated in the
agreement separately contracted to work for the employer,
since the collective agreements were referable solely and
distinctly to a condition of employment. Moreover, these
judges realized, as do the modern judges, that neither of the
acquiescing parties could force the individuals to make contracts of employment anymore than the same individuals
could be made to work against their will. On the other hand,
neither the employee nor the union to which he belonged
could force the employer to hire any workers at all. Hence,
the most that could be said for such agreements was that
they governed the relations of the employer with the employees only in the event that the individual agreements of
employment were completed.
From this pristine view of the subject some of the courts
came to the questionable conclusion that since these collective agreements were not contracts of employment they
5

Harper v. Local Union No. 520, 48 S. W. (2d) 1033 (Tex. Civ. App. 1932).
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were not contracts in any sense. These courts in the early
adjudications said that such agreements were mere devices
to induce the hiring of workers. In this manner there arose
what is known as the "usage theory" of collective bargaining agreements. This theory considers the collective agreement to be not a contract but a mere usage which may become a part of the individual contract of employment. In
Hudson v. Cincinnati,N. 0. & T. P. Ry. Co.,' a Kentucky
decision and one of the early leading cases on the subject,
although not holding affirmatively for the point, the plaintiff was a locomotive engineer who sued the defendant company for compensation for time lost following his summary
discharge for an alleged infraction of the defendant company's rules. The plaintiff based his claim upon a provision
contained in a collective agreement which his union had
negotiated with the defendant company, which provision
stipulated that a discharged employee should be entitled to
a hearing within ten days of his dismissal and, further, that
this and other regulatory provisions were to be in effect
between the union and the employer for a period of two
years. The plaintiff claimed that this constituted a mutual
obligation of employment between the employer and the
employees for the two-year period and that he had been
discharged in violation of the agreement. The important
part of the case is that in the course of the opinion the court
said that a collective agreement is not a contract but "comes
squarely within the definition of a usage." ' However, the
court decided against the plaintiff here and held that the
particular clause in question could not be understood to have
been incorporated into the individual contract of employment because it was a contract terminable at will and as such
was clearly inconsistent with any contrary provisions for
6 152 Ky. 711, 154 S. W. 47 (1913).
7 See Byrd v. Beal, 150 Ala. 122, 43 So. 749, 124 Am. St. Rep. 60 (197).
There the court said a" usage refers to "an established method of dealing, adopted
in a particular place, or by those engaged in a particular vocation or trade, which
acquires legal force, because people make contracts in reference to it."
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a hearing or for a definite two-year contractual period.
Hence, the rule of the case would seem to be that a collective agreement creates a usage which becomes a part of
an existing or subsequent contract of employment between
the employer and the employee in the absence of any deliberately conflicting contract between them.
In a later Kentucky case,8 however, the court took a
more liberal view. Here the defendant, a freight conductor,
sought to displace the plaintiff, a passenger conductor. The
question was primarily one of seniority between the different classes of conductors and the railroad was joined as a
nominal defendant. The court held for the plaintiff in the
case despite the fact that he was not a member of the union
with which the railroad had the collective agreement involving seniority. The court based its decision squarely upon the collective bargaining agreement between the union
and the railroad and held that the terms of the agreement
constituted a usage which the plaintiff and the railroad obviously intended should govern their relations and upon
which the plaintiff was entitled to rely. And in keeping with
this ruling the plaintiff was granted an injunction to restrain
any intdrference with his seniority right. In accord with
this Kentucky case there are several others which hold
similarly that a collective bargaining agreement creates a
usage, which automatically becomes a part of the individual employment contract without any express adoption unless the individual contract is made contrary to the terms
of the collective agreement.'
Gregg v. Starks, 188 Ky. 834, 224 S. W. 459 (1920).
9 Cross Mountain Coal Co. v. Ault, 9 S. W. (2d) 692 (Tenn. 1928) (Holding that an agreement between coal mine operators and miners as to wages and
conditions of employment became a part of, and formed a basis of, the contract
of employment between each operator accepting it and each employee who entered into or continued in such operator's service with knowledge of its execution, in the absence of any express contract between the individual employee and
the operator inconsistent therewith.); Moody v. Model Window Glass Co., 145
Ark. 197, 224 . W. 436 (1920) (Holding that where the correspondence between
the plaintiff window company and the defendants warranted the defendants in
believing that they would be given employment at the plaintiff's plant from a
8
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As opposed to this ruling there is another line of cases
which hold that a usage so created may be incorporated
into the individual contract of employment only by express
adoption." In one of the leading cases on this point the
Missouri court said " that the mere fact that one employed
to work in a mine was asked on applying for employment
if he understood the rules under which the mine was working, the days of payment, etc., and responded that he did,
did not amount to an adoption by the parties, as a part of
their contract, of an understanding between the mine owner
and the Miners' Union, of which the servant was a member, governing the time and manner of the payment of the
wages. Thus, the court here went to the other extrefne and
held that the terms of the collective labor agreement must
be adopted expressly, if at all, even as between a member
of the union and an employer who has an agreement with
that union. There are, however, still other cases in this
category which strike the medium view and hold that the
collective labor agreement governs the individual employment if "known" at the time of hiring.' 2 But, in any event,
all the cases would agree that where the usage theory of
given date, or be paid $20 a-week until the plant was in operation, in accordance
with the national agreement between the window glass manufacturers of the
United States and the national window glass workers, and the defendants paid
their own transportation and expenses from California to the plaintiff's plant in
Arkansas but remained unemployed, the plaintiff cannot recover from them the
$40 paid them for two weeks and the defendants cart recover the $20 a week
coming to them under the agreement.). See, also, St. Louis B. & M. Ry. Co. v.
Booker, 58 S. W. (2d) 856 (Tex. Civ. App. 1928); Hudson v. Cincinnati N. 0.
& T. P. Ry. Co., op. cit. supra,note 6.
10 Panhandle & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Wilson, 55 S. W. (2d) 216 (Tex. Civ. App.
1932) (The headnote states: "Individual members of labor unions are not bound
by contracts between union and employers unless agreements are ratified by members, and in absence of such ratification, no rights accrue to employee.");
Burnetta v. Marceline Coal Co., 180 Mo. 241, 79 S. W. 136 (1904). See Rentschler v. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 253 N. W. 694 (Neb. 1934), which holds that a
collective labor agreement, "being a general offer, becomes a binding contract
when it is adopted into, and made a part of, the individual contract of each
employee. A breach of its terms will give rise to a cause of action by either party."
11 Burnetta v. Marceline Coal Co., op. cit. supra note 10.
12 U. S. Daily Publishing Co. v. Nichols, 32 Fed. (2d) 834 (1929)
(A
custom of paying wages subject to adjustment on the terminations for a new
wage scale was held binding on a publisher opening a union shop with knowledge
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the collective agreement is sought to be invoked any individual employment contract with terms contrary to the
collective agreement amounts to a repudiation of the usage,
leaving both the employee and the union without legal protection.18
As opposed to the usage theory of the collective bargaining agreement there is another which the courts dnd commentators have designated as the "agency theory." 14 Under this scheme of reasoning the union is regarded as the
agent for its members and the collective agreement as a
contract negotiated with the employer for and on behalf
of the employees.1 But, as was said in a Kentucky case, "a
trade union is not the agent of. a member for the purpose of
waiving any personal right he may have, but only for the
limited purpose of securing for him, together with all of
the other members, fair and just wages and good working
conditions." 16 And, of course, such an agency would not
exist as to nonunion employees since their nonmembership
in the agency would preclude any possibility of a presumpof the custom even though the publisher was not a member of the association
making the agreement.). See, also, Cross Mountain Coal Co. v. Ault, op. cit.
suPra note 9 (Recovery precluded if the employee was unaware of the collective
agreement.).
18 Langmade v. Olean Brewing Co., 137 App. Div. 355, 121 N. Y. S. 388
(1910) (Here there werespecial circumstances, viz., the continuance of the plaintiff in the defendant's employ after his frequent demands for overtime pay had
been refused, to rebut any presumption that might otherwise have existed as to
the adoption of the terms of the collective labor agreement as a usage.).
14 For a general discussion of the various theories of enforceability of collective labor agreements, see: Rice, Collective Labor Agreements in American
Law, 44 HARV. L. Rav. 572 (1930); Fuchs, Collective Labor Agreements in American Law, 10 ST. Louis L. Rav. 1 (1925); Duguit, Collective Acts as Distinguished
From Contracts, 27 YALE L. JOUR. 753 (1917).
15 Barnes & Co. v. Berry, 156 Fed. 72 (C. C. S. D. Ohio 1907) (This case
treats unions as the agent and the collective agreement as the individual contract
of employment.); West v. B. & 0. Ry. Co., 103 W. Va. 417, 137 S. E. 654 (1927)
(An agreement between a labor union and an employer with respect to wages
and conditions of service, not ratified by the members of the union as individuals, does not establish a contract between the individual member and the
employer a breach of which will sustain an action by the individual.). See, also,
Aden v. Louisville & N. Ry. Co., 276 S. W. 511 (Ky. 1921).
16 Piercy v. Louisville & N. Ry. Co., 198 Ky. 477, 248 S. W. 1042, 1045
(1913).
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tion that the union contracted in their behalf. Moreover,
it would not be an easy thing to find such an agency as to
employees who joined the union subsequent to the completion of the collective agreement " since prior authority
or subsequent ratification is necessary to validate an
agency.i
Still another theory of enforceability is the "third party
beneficiary theory." The rationale of this one is that the collective agreement is regarded as a contract valid and subsisting between the employer and the union for the benefit
of the employees. In what is perhaps the leading case on this
branch of the law the Supreme Court of Mississippi held 9
that a working agreement between a labor union and an
employer is primarily for the benefit of the individual members and rights thereunder are enforceable directly by the
members. The court also outlined the circumstances under
which a third party should be allowed recovery: "(1) When
the terms of the contract are expressly broad enough to include the third party either by name or as one of a specified
class, and (2) the third party was evidently within the intent of the terms so used, the third party will be within its
benefits, if (3) the promisee had, in fact, a substantial and
articulate interest in the welfare of the said third party
in respect to the subject of the contract." 20 And in keepSee 41 YALE L. JOUR. 1221 (1932).
See Rice, op. cit. supra note 14, at 594, for criticism of the agency theory,
namely, that a contract between a union as the employee's agent and the employer is illusory since the union's principal, the employee, need not accept the
employment at all; and if he does, he may, at his option, make a different contract.
18 According to the Burnetta case, op. cit. supra note 10, mere knowledge
or understanding of the rules of the collective agreement would not be enough
to constitute a ratification of the contractual agency; express consent is necessary.
19 Yazoo & M. V. R. Co. v. Sideboard, 161 Miss. 4, 133 So. 699 (1931)
(The case follows Gulla v. Barton, 164 App. Div. 293, 149 N. Y. S. 952 (1914),
and H. Blum & Co. v. Landau, 23 Ohio App. 426, 155 N. E. 154 (1926)). See later
cases in accord: Johnson v. American Ry. Express Co., 163 S. C. 198, 161 S. E.
473 (1931); Hall v. St. Louis & S. F. Ry. Co., 224 Mo. App. 431, 28 S. W.(2d)
687 (1930).
20 Cf.: CONTRACTS, 13 C. J. 703-711; CONTRACTS, 6 R. C. L. 882-890; 2
ELLIOTT ON CONTRACTS § 1412 et seq.; Smyth v. City of New York, 203 N. Y.
106, 96 N. E. 409 (1910).
17
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ing with this principle the case held that the plaintiff, a colored brakeman on a passenger train, had a sufficient interest in a collective contract between the railroad and the labor
union to entitle him to maintain an action for compensation under the agreement.2 1
Obviously, this theory meets with acceptance only in those
jurisdictions that approve the doctrine of Lawrence v. Fox.22
As was indicated in the Mississippi case,2 3 it is immaterial
that the employee is not a member of the union (a fact fatal
to the agency theory) if an intent can be found in the collective agreement to benefit nonunion employees. Likewise,
since a donee beneficiary can acquire rights under a contract even though he is unidentified at the time the contract
is made,24 it does not matter under this third party beneficiary theory of collective agreements that an employee has
joined the union or has become an employee since the consummation of the collective agreement.2" Nor can the terms
of an individual contract preclude the application of the collective agreement to the individual employee but, a fortiori,
the two agreements may even be in conflict.2 6 Furthermore,
21 The labor union was composed exclusively of white men but the agreement contained a provision that it should apply to white and colored employees
alike. Plaintiff was denied recovery, however-, because his acceptance of the railroad checks as "payment in full" acted as an estoppel to deny.
22 See: I WLMUSTON, CONTRACTS § 368; RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF CONTRACTS (1932) § 133; 31 COL. L. REv. 1156. Contra, see, Young v. Canadian
Northern Ry. Co. [1931] A. C. 83; Kessell v. Great Northern Ry. Co., 51 Fed.
(2d) 304 (W. D. Wash. 1931); St. Louis I. M. & So. Ry. Co. v. Matthews, 64
Ark. 398, 42 S. W. 902 (1897).
23 Yazoo & M. V. R. Co. v. Sideboard, op. cit. supra note 19.
24 I WILLSTON, op. cit. supra note 22, at § 378; RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW
OF CONTRACTS § 139.

Whitehead v. Burgess, 61 N. J. L. 75, 38 Atl. 802 (1897).
See Gulla v. Barton, op. cit. supra note 19 (An employer, to prevent
strikes and in consideration of the right to use the union name and label, entered into a contract with the labor union by which only union men were to be
employed and all employees were to be paid $18 a week. The plaintiff, a member of the union, without knowledge of such contract, worked for the employer
for a considerable period for $9 a week, the wages agreed upon by him and the
employer. Upon learning of the union contract the plaintiff informed the employer that he would seek to recover his back pay at law, and thereafter he was
paid the union wages. Held, that the plaintiff, having been a party intended to
be benefited by the agreement, and having been connected with the consideration
25

26
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the third party beneficiary is not bound at all by the terms
of the collective agreement since he was not one of the contracting parties and has not participated directly in the
quid pro quo. Hence, as between the employer and the employee and their mutual relations it is entirely a one-sided
arrangement, the employer having no remedies at all against
the employee for a breach of the agreement. Moreover, since
the third party beneficiary theory does not provide for the
creation of rights against individuals not parties to the
agreement directly, it is as a consequence said to be defective not only as above, where the employer attempts to sue
the employee, but also where the employee attempts to assert
rights against an individual employer under an agreement
which is made by an employers' association with the union.
In the first instance, however, the handicap is not a serious
one if the employee can be held bound under the usage
agreement into
theory by the incorporation of the collective
28
his individual contract of employment.
In all three theories there is always the question of agency,
usage, or third party to be settled. Withal it skips the further
problem of whether or not the direct parties to the agreement (that is, the union and the employers' association) are
bound in their associate capacity by its terms and suable for
a breach of the said agreement. That problem resolves itself
into the question of whether the collective agreement may
therefore by reason of his paying fees and dues as a member of the union, was
entitled to enforce the contract and to recover the difference between the wages
paid him and the union wages. Moreover, the plaintiff did not, by entering into
an independent agreement, express or implied, with his employer or otherwise,
waive the benefit of the contract between the employer and the union.).
27
See Rice, op. cit. supra note 14. Of course the employer might be considered bound under a iheory of principal and agent with the employer's association being the agent in making the contract, but a ratification would be a
necessary part of the proof.
28 See Whiting Milk Companies v. Grondin, 282 Mass. 41, 184 N. E. 379
(1933), where an agreement between the union and the employer preventing the
employee from selling dairy products to the employer's customers as the servant
of another employer for a period of 90 days from the date of the cessation of
employment was held binding on the milk wagon driver who worked under the
agreement as a member of the union.
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be said to constitute a bilateral contract between the two
associations. The greatest obstacle to such legal recognition
lies in the dubious legal status of the parties, that is, the
dispute as to whether the unincorporated trade unions and
employers' associations should be regarded as legal entities,
and whether such associations exist at all in the eyes of the
law. It might be interpolated here that to recognize an employee as a third party beneficiary of a collective agreement
does not automatically give legal recognition to the unincorporated union for the contract may as well be regarded as
one between the employer and the officers of the union who
participate in making the agreement for the benefit of the
employees."
For a long time the courts held that such unincorporated
associations did not exist as legal entities and regarded them
as mere collections of individuals, like a partnership, and
their names but collective pseudonyms for the individuals
composing them.8" Chief Justice Taft gave a summation of
the matter in the famous Coronado case 81 when he said.
"Undoubtedly, at common law, an unincorporated association of
persons was not recognized as having any other character than a part-

nership in whatever was done, and it could only sue or be sued in the
names of its members, and their liability had to be enforced against
each member. Pickett v. Walsh, 192 Mass. 572, 6 L. R. A. (N. S.)
1067, 116 Am. St. Rep. 272, 78 N. E. 753, 7 Ann. Cas. 638; Karges
Furniture Co. v. Amalgamated Woodworkers Local Union, 165 Ind.
421, 2 L. R. A. (N. S.) 788, 75 N. E. 877, 6 Ann. Cas. 829; Baskins
v. United Mine Workers of America... 234 S. W. 464 [Ark. 1921].
gut the growth and necessities of these great labor organizations have

brought affirmative legal recognition of their existence and usefulness
and provisions for their protection, which their members have found
necessary."

In the opinion in this case it was stated that a union is an
entity which is suable as such, upon process served on its
principal officers, for damages arising from its violation of
the Sherman Act and the torts committed by it during
20
80

31

But see: 31 CoL. L. REv. 1156 (1931); 9 IND. L. JouR. 69 (1933).

See Fuchs, op. cit. supra note 14.
United Mine Workers v. Coronada Coal Co., 259 U. S. 334, 385 (1922).
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strikes; and the strike funds are subject to be levied upon
in execution of the judgment. 2 It would seem to follow
logically from this holding that since it can be sued for the
tort it commits a union should also be suable for a breach
of the contract it makes. Many cases in accord with this
principle have indirectly recognized such associations as entities at law 33 and they are consistently being dealt with
as such. 4 Thus, in a Federal case an action for damages
against the union for an alleged breach of its collective agreement was sustained and the court went completely over to
the contract view of the matter when it held that a contract
between labor unions and a number of employers regulating
wages and terms of employment, and absolutely binding
the employers to employ none but members of the unions,
if such members were available, imposed the reciprocal obligation on the members of the unions to work according
to the contract in good faith; and the case further held that
the unions were responsible for the action of a considerable
number of their members in refusing to unload a ship for
one of the employers unless paid more than the rate of
wages set forth in the collective agreement and the unions
were liable for this breach. 5
32 See Dodd, Dogma and Practice In The Law Of Associations, 42 HAsv.
L. REv. 977 (1929).
33 Schlesinger v. Quinto, 201 App. Div. 487, 194 N. Y. S. 401 (1922);
Goyette v. Watson, 245 Mass. 577, 140 N. E. 285 (1923); Nederlandsch Amenkaansche Sloomvaart Maatschappij v. Stevedores' & Longshoremen's Benev. Soc.,
265 Fed. 397 (1920); Gulla v. Barton, op. cit. supra note 19.
34 For full discussion of the subject see: Roberts, Labor Unions, Corporations-the Coronada Case, 5 ILL. L. QUAR. 200 (1923); Sturgess, Uydncorporated
Associations as Parties To Actions, 33 YALE L. JOUR. 383 (1924).
Prior to the Coronada decision the uniform current of authority in the United
States was to the'effect that, apart from statute, an unincorporated labor union
could neither sue nor be sued as such. See LANDIS, CASES ON LASOR LAw (1934)
footnote, p. 378; American Steel and Wire Co. v. Wire Drawers' and Die Makers'
Unions, 90 Fed. 598 (C. C. N. D. Ohio 1898); American Federation of Labor v.
Bucks Stove & Range Co., 33 App. D. C. 83 (1909); Grand Internat'l Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers v. Green, 206 Ala. 196, 89 So. 435 (1921).
35 Nederlandsch Amerikaansche Sloomvaart Maatschappij v. Stevedores' &
Longshoremen's Benev. Soc., op. cit. supra note 33, at 399. See 43 HAav. L. REv.
1009, for growing tendency to recognize union associations as entities. See David
Adler & Sons Co. v. Maglio, 228 N. W. 123 (Wis. 1929), in which the Wisconsin
court allowed an association to appear as a party.
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Besides the direct recognition of collective bargaining
agreements as valid contracts by the courts of law there
has been also an indirect recognition to a limited extent
by the courts of equity. " For example, collective agreements
have been protected from intentional interference by third
persons where the equity court, on the petition .of either
party to the collective agreement, has issued an injunction
restraining any third party who has set about to induce or
compel one of the contracting parties to repudiate or to
breach the agreement. The indirect legal recognition of such
agreements comes from the underlying necessity for every
court of equity to judge of the legality of an act sought to
be enjoined, and in view of the additional rule that the
validity of acts in combination depends ipon the lawfulness
of purpose.37 Thus, in Tracey v. Osborne 11 the Massachusetts Court held that where a labor union and certain employers stipulated that the union, so long as it was able to
do it, should have all the employers' work, another labor
union's exertion of pressure upon the employees to have
them break the contract was an invasion of the contracting
union's right and as such would be enjoined. In this manner
the court recognized indirectly the contractual validity of
'the collective agreement and said "the rights secured to
the plaintiffs under their contracts are such as are protected in the ordinary case by injunction. Beekman v. Masters, 195 Mass. 205, 80 N. E. 817, 11 L. R. A. (N. S.)
201.. ." And a later Massachusetts decision " held similarly
that the remedy at law of a labor union against the members of another, which by solicitation, intimidation and
violence are seeking to cause employers to repudiate their
contracts with the plaintiffs and to cause the plaintiffs' members to repudiate the contract with the employers, is not
36

Goyette v. Watson, op. cit. supra note 33; Tracey v. Osborn, 114 N. E.

959 (Mass. 1917).
37
See Kerbp v. Division No. 241, 255 IU. 213, 99 N. E. 389 (1912).
38 Op. cit. supra note 36.
30 Goyette v. Watson, op. cit. supra note 33.
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plain and adequate so as to defeat injunctive relief. The
case of Stillwell Theatre v. Kaplan 40 illustrates the contrary doctrine. There the New York court denied an injunction to a theatre owner who sought to restrain members of
a second union from picketing to persuade the public not to
patronize the petitioner's theatre; the court refused to issue the restraining injunction even though the acts of the
defendant union were calculated to cause the theatre owner
to breach his contract with the first union which contract
provided that he should employ their labor exclusively. The
New York court, quoting from the earlier case of Exchange
Bakery & Restaurant v. Rifkin," said:
"'Resulting injury [from lawful picketing] is incidental and must
be endured.'"
And, further, the court said:
"The interests of capital and- labor are at times inimical and the
courts may not decide controversies between the parties so long as
neither resorts to violence, deceit, or misrepresentation to bring about
desired results." 42

The foregoing discussion concerns equitable relief by injunction against interference by third persons with the rights
created by the collective bargaining agreement. Another type
of judicial recognition of the contractual status of such
agreements lies in the possibility of equitable restraint of a
breach of the agreement by one of the parties to it. Such
relief against one of the contracting parties (that is, the
union or the employer) was at first denied because it was
thought that the granting of such relief would be a violation
of the rule that equity will not enjoin a breach of contract
for personal services except where the services are unique
or extraordinary in character; and the further rule that
182 N. E. 63 (N. Y. 1932).
41 245 N. Y. 260, 157 N. E. 130 (1927).
42 This case is contra to Hltchman Coal and Coke Co. v. Mitchell, 245 U. S.
229 (1918). See 11 N. Y. UNIV. L. QuAR. Rav. 262, 268, for the proposition that
40

the Stillwell case is to be distinguished in that the plaintiff himself was the one
that the defendants were inducing to breach the contract.
Accord: J. H. & S. Theatres Inc. v. Fay, 260 N. Y. 315, 183 N. E. 509 (1932);
Church Shoe Co. v. Turner, 218 Mo. App. 516, 279 S. W. 232 (1926).
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equity will not accomplish indirectly, by an injunction, that
which it could not enforce directly by a decree of specific
performance. In other words the courts feared that such
relief would be a violation of the principle that in equity
there must be a mutuality of remedy and hence equity will
not enjoin a breach by one party if it would not, in the opposite case, issue a decree of specific performance. Thus, an
early New York court held that an injunction will not lie
to restrain the breach of a contract to employ only members
of a certain "stone cleaners' and pointers' union," the employment not being unique or extraordinary.43 It would
seem that in this early case the court failed to distinguish
between a collective bargaining agreement and an individual contract of employment. The later case of Schlesinger
v. Quinto 4 made clear this distinction. In that case an
association of employers passed a resolution which, if effectuated, would have violated the collective bargaining
agreement between the union and the association. The court
there granted an injunction restraining the association from
such action and, after referring to the doctrine that there
must be a mutuality of both remedy and obligation, said:
"The distingushing feature of ,those cases and this under consideration is in the principles applicable to each. In the first, the court cannot
supervise his work, and has no power against the man's will to make
him work; also in the first and second cases, another man can be.em-

ployed to do the work, and: any detriment could be compensated in
damages. The instant case does not arise out of a contract for in-

dividual employment. Two organizations, one composed of employers
the other of employees, have entered into an agreement. Each had
power through the consent of its members to enter into a binding
obligation in their behalf. By the constitution or by-laws of each,
power is given to the organization to enforce, through disciplinary pro-

ceedings which have been demonstrated to be effective, compliance with
the terms and conditions to which it has subscribed. This contract
had mutual obligations binding on the parties thereto. Each party
43 Stone Cleaning and Pointing Union v. Russell, 38 Misc. Rep. 513, 77 N.
Y. S. 1049 (1902). Accord: Schwartz v. Wayne Circuit Judge, 217 Mich. 384,
186 N. W. 522 (1922).
44

Op. it.
supra note 33. This was one of the earliest cases on record where

the union was awarded an injunction.
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knows the obligation that it has assumed and the consequence of the
failure or refusal to perform those requirements. Through its control
of its members it can compel performance. Under such circumstances,
a decree of a court of equity can be enforced against either party and in
favor of the other. . . .An organization having such power to require
performance by individual members can, through its officers, be compelled to exercise that power. There is in this contract a mutuality of
obligation, and -there is also a mutuality of remedy for its enforcement." 45
The same distinction was earlier pointed out by a Federal
Court in the well-known case of Barnes v. Berry 11 in which
the court granted a restraining injunction against the union
officers, and said:
"The service of the employees, members of the union, is neither
special, extraordinary, nor unique in the sense that it could not otherwise be supplied, and that its loss would cause irreparable injury,
and it is not sought to restrain them from quitting the service of their
employers, but only that their officers, agents and representatives be
restrained from inciting them to strike, unless the contract be so modified as to make provision for the 'eight hour day' and the 'closed shop'
and to make it effective at once. It is not a question, therefore, of
whether the men at work shall be enjoined from striking, but it is a
question of whether the officers, and agents, and representatives of
these men, who represent the organization and control it, shall be permitted to incite the men to strike, to induce them to strike, and thereby repudiate the contract which was made by them through their agents
at the January convention of 1907."
It is in conformity with this principle that many cases
have held that attempts by a union to incite its men to strike
in violation of the collective agreement between the union
and the employer may be enjoined, upon a petition by the
employer, on the ground that such a breach will cause ir45 Accord: Weber v. Nasser, 286 Pac. 1074 (Cal. App. 1930), appeal dismissed, 210 Cal. 607, 292 Pac. 637 (1930) (A musicians' union was held entitled
to enforce a collective bargaining contract calling for the maintenance of minimum
sized orchestras in theatres.); Pearlman v. Millman, 7 Law & Labor 286 (Mass.
Super. Ct. 1925); Ribner v. Rasco Butter & Egg Co., 135 Misc. 616, 238 N. Y. S.
132 (1929); Harper v. Local Union No. 520, 48 S. W. (2d) 1033 (Tex. Civ. App.
1932). See Witte, Labor's Resort to the Injunction, 39 YALE L. JoUa. 374 (1930).
Contra: Swartz v. Wayne Circuit Judge, op. cit. supra note 43; Schwartz v.
Cigar Makers' Internat'l Union, 219 Mich. 589, 189 N. W. 55 (1922); Stone
Cleaning and Pointing Union v. Russell, op. cit. supra note 43.
46 156 Fed. 72 (1907).
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reparable injury to the employer's business. 7 To invoke the
aid of equity in this regard, however, it is necessary that
the employer be performing his part of the collective agreement in keeping with the equitable doctrine that "He who
comes into a court of equity must come with clean hands."
The New York Supreme Court sets out the principle quite
clearly:
"It is within the right of any man to cease work whenever he likes,
but the determination to quit work must be his and not that of another. It matters not whether the agreement between the local and
the employers was one which might be terminated at will or at the
end of a year, the rule would apply with equal force. Hitchman Coal
and Coke Co. v. Mitchell, 245 U. S. 229, at page 251. .

. .

A contract

creates property rights. Those rights may not be taken away from a
party to the contract unless by his consent or through his o*n default or his failure to comply with the terms thereof. These plaintiffs

desire to continue under the contract until its termination. The local
council has expressly provided that work would continue uninterriiptedly as long as the agreements were lived up to by the employers.
No cause is shown for the termination of the agreement, except the desire for an increased wage, and, while that may be desirable from the
standpoint of the local union and its members, they should not be permitted to disregard the obligations of -their contract to the great detriment of these plaintiffs when the contract has been fully performed
by the plaintiffs. Altman v. Schlesinger, 204 App. Div. 513, 198 N. Y. S.
128; Schlesinger v. Quinto, 201 App. Div. 487, 194, N. Y. S. 401. The
granting of the relief asked for here is not a mere gesture. If the members of this local perform services in violation of the orders of the
officers of the local, they will be in bad standing in the union and subject to the penalties prescribed thereby. If the strike may not be called
by reason of the intervention of the court, the men may continue to
work if they please without the danger of suffering the penalties provided in the event of their failure to follow the commands of the
officers of the local." 48

Under this view a collective bargaining agreement is a
contract between the union and the other party, either a
single employer or an employer's association. A contract
creates property rights. And equity will enjoin any real or
47 See Burgess v. Georgia, F. & A. Ry. Co., 92 Ga. 53, 96 S. E. 854 (1918);
Meltzer v. Kaminer, 227 N. Y. S. 459 (1927); Barnes v. Berry, op. cit. supra
note 46. Contra: Stone Cleaning and Pointing Union v. Russell, op. cit. supra
note 43.
48 Meltzer v. Kaminer, op. cit. supra note 47, at 461, 462.
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threatened injury with a property right provided there is
no plain and adequate remedy at law for the injury, and, provided, that the petitioning party has acted in good faith
throughout. Hence, any strike contrary to the terms of the
collective bargaining agreement is unlawful and the said
strike together with its incidents, the picket and the boycott,
will be enjoined by a court of equity along with any aid or
instigation by union officials.4 9 But of course, where the
employer breaches the agreement himself and by the operation of the "clean hands" doctrine precludes the invocation of the aid of equity it would seem that the employees
are released from any restraints that the agreement might
otherwise impose and should be allowed to strike and picket
peacefully the same as in a case where there is no governing collective bargaining agreement. The operation of the
principle was illustrated in an Oregon case " where an employer sought to enjoin labor unions from picketing; it was
held there that since the retail shoe-store owner had broken
the agreement previously made with the Clerks' Union the
strike by the Clerks' Union was legally justified and the
union through its members had a right to notify union men
that the storekeeper was unfair to organized labor if the
notification was accomplished in a peaceful and lawful manner, the damage to the storekeeper being simply "damnum
absque injuria." And in a New York case, 5 on a similar
point, the plaintiffs' (employers) motion to continue an injunction from picketing was denied because the plaintiffs
themselves had broken the wage-scale provision of the collective bargaining agreement with the union without resorting to the readjustment machinery agreed upon.
It would follow likewise on principle that if the union of
employees which is a party to a collective agreement with
49 See Barnes v. Berry, op. cit. supra note 46; FRANwxURTER AND G.=mE,
Tim LABOR INJUNCTION 104.
50 Greenfield v. Central Labor Council of Portland, 104 Oregon 236, .192
Pac. 783 (1920).
51 Segenfield v. Friedman, 117 Misc. Rep. 731, 193 N. Y. S. 128 (1922).
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an employer is guilty of conduct inimical to the agreement
the employer should be released from any contractual trammels against "locking out" the said union employees. And
in a recent New York case 52 it was held on this point that
no injunction may issue against a lockout by an employers'
association if the agreement between the association and the
plaintiff labor union was previously breached by the plaintiff or if the said agreement did not prohibit a lockout expressly or by implication. Albeit a resort to such common
means of securing respective labor rights is not obviated
once the prevailing collective agreement has been breached
by the union or the employer, nevertheless, it can be safely
concluded from this cursory glance at the cases holding with
the majority view of the matter that the court of equity
is able t6 maintain industrial peace in the absence of a
preliminary breach and, what is more, is able to do so in a
manner beneficial to both parties in the conflict and in strict
consonance with the terms that the parties themselves have
assumed.
In all of the foregoing theories anent the recognition and
enforcement of a collective bargaining agreement as a valid
contract at law, the presumption has been indulged in that
all of the necessary elements of a valid contract were present. Yet one of the most formidable objections to such contractual recognition is that a true contract must be entered
into voluntarily, and there is, as a matter of fact, seldom accompanying a collective bargaining agreement that species
of contractual freedom which the courts zealously demand
as a sine qua non. It is very likely, however, that this criticism may be relegated to the very dim background with
the advent of the modem conception of economic freedom in
place of the antiquated doctrine of abstract freedom.
Another objection to contractual recognition that has
been broached is that collective agreements lack that necessary contractual element of consideration because all of the
52

Moran v. Lasette, 221 App. Div. 118, 223 N. Y. S. 283 (1927).
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promises are made by the employer and seemingly none by
the union. Economic thought has had a major part in moving the courts to look with a new light on this situation as
well and the modem courts have seen fit to circumvent the
obstacle by taking the realistic approach and, as a consequence, deeming it unnecessary that the collective agreement should contain in it any provision which will guarantee
to the employer the services of the employees since modern
economic compulsion will operate to take the place of legal
force in compelling performance in this regard." a Thus, in
Cross Mountain Coal Co. v. Ault " the court said:
"We think, however, that the failure of the plaintiff to bind himself to continue in the service of his employer cannot impair or render
unenforceable the contractual undertaking of the employer to refrain
from discharging the plaintiff under such circumstances as to do him
at injustice and to abide by the award of the board of arbitration...
and also to refrain from discriminating against the plaintiff as an
employee because of membership in any organization. The plaintiff
had accepted the terms of employment and had worked under them
from April, 1920, to May, 1921, and had held himself in readiness to
resume work under the contract until the mine was reopened in November, 1921. There was certainly sufficient consideration passing from
the plaintiff to his employer to support the contract and render it
enforceable in the particulars here involved."

Consideration for the employer's promises, however, when
not specifically mentioned in the agreemelnt, is often found
in the implied promise of the union to refrain from interfering with the employer's conduct of the business.55 And
a promise not to interfere would qualify as good consideration since it is undoubtedly a legal detriment in view of the
now universally recognized right of a union to call a strike
for a lawful purpose when it is not in violation of any
specific covenant.5"
53

See 18 MARQUETjE L. REv. 251.

54 Op. cit. supra note 9, at 696.
55 See Harper v. Local Union No. 520, op. cit. supra note 5. Cf. Gulla V.
Barton, op. cit. supra note 19; 18 MARQUETTE L. Rzv. 251; 41 YALE L. JOUR.
1221, 1225.

56

See Sayre, Labor and the Courts, 39 YALE L. JOUa. 682, 696.
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There remains the further consideration of the validity
of the collective bargaining agreement that provides for a
"closed union shop": that is, an agreement with the employer that every employee shall be a member of the controlling, union. This phase of the subject is of especial importance in view of the effect, or proposed effect, of Section 7-A of the National Industrial Recovery Act. The validity of the so-called "closed shop" has long been a mooted
legal point and, sad to say, the recent Federal legislation
as to labor has been of no material aid in settling the issue
but really, by its emphasis on collective bargaining, leaves
this ramification in a more turbulent state than before. However, the common law on the subject will first receive attention.
Some of the early decisions of the courts put the burden
of proof on the labor union which procures the closed shop;
that is, these courts have held that a justification for the
closed shop provision must be proved else it becomes the
basis for the presumption of an attempted monopoly of labor
in restraint of trade and void by reason of being opposed
to public policy. Thus, in a New Jersey case on the subject."
it was held that the provision of a contract between an association, representing nearly all the building contractors
of New York City and Long Island, and an association representing the labor unions thereof violated public policy
as to monopolies when it sought to bind the said contractors
to employ only union men in their enterprises and had for
its object the closed shop and the monopolization of that
labor market by the unions. In so holding this case follows
the early leading case of Conners v. Connolly s in which the
Connecticut Court said:
". .. the authorities are, as far as we have observed, in complete
accord in holding that, where the agreement is one which takes in an
entire industry of any considerable proportions in a community, so
57 Lehigh Structural Steel Co. v. Atlanta Smelting and Refining Works, 92
N. J. Eq. 131, 111 Ati. 376 (1920).
.58 86 Conn. 641, 86 Aft. 600, 45 L. R. A. (N. S.) 564 (1913).
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that it operates generally in that community to prevent or to seriously
deter craftsmen from working at their craft or workingmen obtaining
employment under favorable conditions without joining a union, it is
contrary to public policy. .

.

. It needs no argument to demonstrate

that any combination between employers and employed, which creates
a condition in a community such as has been hereinbefore described,
is a serious menace to the craftsman or workingman who, in the exercise of his free right of choice, does not wish to join a union. It is
calculated to place upon his freedom of choice and action a coercion
which leaves him no longer wholly free. Its tendency is to expose him
to the tyranny of the will of others, and to bring about a monopoly
which will exclude what he has to dispose of and what other people
need from the open market, or perhaps from any market."

And both of these cases cited obviously follow the earlier
case of Brennan v. United Hatters " where it was said:
"The common law has long recognized, as a part of th6 boasted
liberty of the citizen, the right of every man to freely engage in such
lawful business or occupation as he himself may choose, free from
hindrance or obstruction by his fellow men, saving such as may result from the exercise of equal or superior rights on their part. .."

And in Curran v. Galen,6" which was long the law of New
York on the subject of the closed shop, the court said in a
per curiam opinion:
"Public policy and the interests of society favor the utmost freedom in the citizen to pursue his lawful trade or calling, and if the
purpose of an organization or combination of workmen be to hamper,
or to restrict that freedom, and, through contracts or arrangements
with employers, to coerce other workingmen to become members of the
organization and to come under its rules and conditions, under the
penalty of the loss of their position and of deprivation of employment,
then that purpose seems clearly unlawful, and militates against the
spirit of our government and the nature of our institutions. The effectuation of such a purpose would conflict with that principle of public
policy which prohibits monopolies and exclusive privileges. It would
tend to deprive the public of the services of men in useful employments and capacities." 61

Where, however, the closed shop is of not so wide a scope

and falls short of effecting a monopoly of the labor market
the tendency of the courts in recent years is to regard the
59
60
61

73 N. J.Law 729, 65 Ad. 165 (1906).
152 N. Y. 33, 46 N. E. 297 (1897).

Cf. Berry v. Donovan, 188 Mass. 353, 74 N. E. 603 (1905).
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agreement merely as one of the valid incidents of union
activities. Thus, in Jacobs v. Cohen6 2 Judge Gray, who wrote
the opinion in Curran v. Galen, sets forth the contrary doctrine and distinguishes the two cases as follows:
"It would seem as though an employer should be, unquestionably,
free to enter into such contract with his workmen for the conduct of
the business, without its being obnoxious on any ground of public
policy. If it might operate to prevent some persons from being em-

ployed by the firm, or, possibly, from remaining in the firm's employment, that is but an incidental feature. Its restrictions were not
of an oppressive nature, operating generally in the community to pre-

vent such craftsmen from obtaining employment and from earning
their livelihood. It was but a private agreement between an employer
and his employees concerning the conduct of the business for one year
and securing to -the latter an absolute right to limit the class of their

fellow workmen to those persons who should be in affiliation with an
organization entered into with the design of protecting their interests
in carrying on the work. . . Their conbination is lawful when it

does not extend so far as to inflict injury upon others, or to oppress
or crush them by excluding them from all employment, unless gained
through joining the labor organization or trades union."

And this more liberal view of the matter was followed in

the later New York case of Kissam v. U. S. Printing Co."s
in which it was held that a contract between an employer
and trades unions prohibiting the employment of nonunion
workmen is not invalid as to such workmen where it results
in great benefit to the employer, disposes of differences be-

tween him and the labor unions, is not entered into with
malice against the nonunion workmen nor with the intent
to injure them, and where it is not sought to compel them
to join the union.64 This liberal view would seem to be the
better one. The employees are not absolutely precluded, in
such a limited case, from finding work elsewhere, and the
incidental fact that the labor market is partially curtailed
is more than compensated in the broad perspective of the
matter by the undeniable social advantages which are ef82

63

.183 N. Y. 207, 76 N. E. 5 (1905).
199 N. Y. 76, 92 N. E. 214 (1910).

64 Accord: Mills v. U. S. Printing Co., 99 App. Div. 605, 91 N. Y. S. 185
(1904); Jacobs v. Cohen, op. cit. supra note 62; Shiosky v. O'Neil, 232 Mass.
99, 121 N. E. 790 (1919); Harper v. Local Union No. 520, op. cit. supra note 5.
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fected by allowing the employees to so bargain collectively
since it is perhaps the only method by which they are able
to deal on an even economic plane with their employer.6" If,
however, the closed union shop binds such a proportion of
the employers in the community that the nonunion men can
obtain employment only with extreme difficulty, then, according to the prevailing line of decisions,6 6 the agreement
would be void by reason of being opposed to public policy
which forbids unreasonable interference with the freedom
of the individual in the pursuit of his trade. The whole subject is well summarized in McCord v. Thompson-Starrett
Co.: 7

"... while an individual employer may lawfully agree with the
labor union to employ only its members, because such agreement is
not of an oppressive nature operating generally throughout the community to prevent craftsmen in the trade from obtaining employment
and earning their livelihood, yet... such an agreement when participated in by all or by a large proportion of employers in any community
becomes oppressive and contrary to public policy, because it operates
generally upon the craftsmen in the trade, and imposes upon them,
as a penalty for refusing to join the favored union, the practical impossibility of obtaining employment at their trade and thereby gaining a livelihood."

Section 6 of the Clayton Act 68 provided that labor was not
a commodity and exempted labor organizations from being
65
See Lasch and Toll, The Validity of Agreements to Employ Union Labor
Exclusively, 3 TEMPLE L. QuAR. 421 (1929); 2 Wxs. L. REv. 369 (1924); 22
MIC . L. REv. 376 (1924).
"A bargains with a labor union to employ only union labor. The bargain is
legal unless the union has such a monopoly as virtually to deprive nonunion
workers of any possibility of employment; and even in that case it is not illegal

if a statute legalizes such labor unions."
§ 515 (18) (1932).

REsTATEMENT OF THE LAW or CONTRACTS

See Conners v. Connolly, op. cit. supra note 58.
67 113 N. Y. S. 385, 387 (1908).
68 38 STAT. 731 (1914), 15 U. S. C. A. § 17 (1926) ("The labor of a human
being.is not a commodity or article of commerce. Nothing contained in the antitrust laws shall be construed to forbid the existence and operation of labor,
agricultural, or horticultural organizations, instituted for the purpose of mutual
help, and not having capital stock or conducted for profit, or to forbid or restrain
individual members of such organizations from lawfully carrying out the legitimate objects thereof; nor shall such organizations, or the members thereof, be
held or construed to be illegal combinations or conspiracies in restraint of trade,
or under the antitrust laws.").
66
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construed as illegal combinations in restraint of trade. But
in the case of Duplex PrintingPress Co. v. Deering 19 the
Supreme Court of the United States said:
"But there is nothing in the section to exempt such an organization
or its members from accountability where it or they depart from its
normal or legitimate objects, and engage in an actual combination
or conspiracy in restraint of trade. And by no fair or permissive construction can it be taken as authorizing any activity otherwise unlawful, or enabling a normally lawful organization to become a cloak

for an illegal combination or conspiracy in restraint of trade, as defined by the anti-trust laws."
Under this line of reasoning a closed shop agreement would
not, under the anti-trust laws, be ipso facto illegal, in view

of the exemption granted to labor unions under the Clayton
Act. However, if such agreement operated to bind an entire
labor market of a trade which directly affected interstate
commerce it would be judged an illegal restraint of interstate commerce in violation of the Sherman Act,7 or in violation of the particular state anti-trust act if such agreement
7
had a similar effect on' purely domestic commerce. 1
Still another aspect of the closed shop that demands consideration is the question of whether or not such an agreement may be tortious in that it induces the breach of an
existing individual contract of employment between the
same employer and a nonunion employee subsequently discharged as a .consequence of the closed shop provision of
the collective agreement. The well-known rule covering this
subject is that the intentional procurement of the breach of
an existent contract, if done with knowledge of the contract
and without just cause or excuse, makes him who causes
the breach liable for the resulting damage, and this is so
even though the tort-feasor acted in promoting his own legitimate interests.72 This principle originated in 1853 with the
69

254 U. S. 443 (1921).

70 .American Steel Foundries v. Tri-City Central Trades Council, 257 U. S.
184 (1921).
71

72

Overland Pub. Co. v. Crocker C6, 193 Cal. 109, 222 Pac. 812 (1924).
R and W Hat Shop v. Sculley, 98 Conn. 1, 118 Atl. 55 (1922).
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English case of Lumley v. Gye,73 in an action on the case
for the breach of a contract of service. The English court
there announced the rule that the duty rests on all persons
not parties to the contract, but having knowledge of it, not
to maliciously procure the breach of the contract, and that
such a violation of the duty is wrongful and for it an action
on the case lies. Bowen v. Hall " reaffirmed this principle as
being applicable to all contracts, and so the law of England
remained. In these cases "maliciously" was used not in the
sense of ill will but rather that the act done was a wrongful and unlawful act. Lord Crompton, in Lumley v. Gye,
said that
". .. a person who wrongfully and maliciously or, which is the
same thing, with notice, interrupts the relation subsisting between master and servant .. . whereby the master is injured, commits a wrongful act..."

And Lord James, in South Wales Mining Federation v.
Glamorgan Coal Co.,"h observed:
"If the breach of the contract of service by the workmen was an
unlawful act, anyone who induces and procures the workmen, without
just cause or excuse, to break such contract, also acts unlawfully, and
thus the allegation that the act done was wrongfully done is established."

In Bromage v. Prosser "' the court defined "maliciously"

by saying that "in a legal sense it means a wrongful act
done intentionally, without just cause or excuse." And for
the Supreme Court of the United States Mr. Justice Brewer
held, in the famous Angle case,77 that "if one maliciously
interferes in a contract between two parties, and induces
one of them to break that contract to the injury of the other,
the party injured can maintain an action against the wrongdoer." A subsequent Supreme Court case 78 explained how
the word "maliciously" was used in the Angle case:
73
74

75
7
77
78

2 El. & B1. 216 (1853).
6 Q. B. Div. 337 (1881).
[1905] A. C. 249.
4 Barn. & Cress. 247 (1825).
Angle v. Chicago, St. P. M. & 0. R. Co., 151 U. S. 1 (1893).
Bitterman v. L. & N. Ry. Co., 207 U. S. 205, 223 (1907).
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"It is not necessary that the ingredient of actual malice in the sense
of personal ill will should exist to bring tlis controversy within the
doctrine of the Angle case. The wanton disregard of the rights of a
carrier causing injury to it . . constitutes legal malice within the
doctrine of the Angle case."

And this doctrine of the necessity for justification for inducing the breach of a contract was reemphasized in the
Massachusetts case of Berry v. Donovan 11 where it was said:
"The primary right of the plaintiff to have the benefit of his contract and to remain undisturbed in the performance of it is universally
recognized ....
Such a right can lawfully be interfered with only by
one who is acting ih the exercise of an equal or superior right which
comes in conflict with the other. An intentional interference with such
right, without lawful justification, is malicious in law, even if it is
from good motives and without express malice."

Thus, in the Massachusetts case of R and W Hat Shop v.
Sculley 80 the court held that the representatives of the labor
union were liable for the resulting damage where, for the
purpose of securing steady employment for the union men,
they induced the manufacturer to breach his contract with
the plaintiff of which contract they had full notice. It is
important, however, to note that many cases have held that
there is no tort involved in inducing the discharge of an
employee who is hired under a contract terminable at the
will of either employee or employer*since there is no property right in employment for no fixed period. Thus, in Harmon v. Uiited Mine Workers of America 1 it was held that
where the mining company had contracted with the Miners'
Union to employ only its members, the discharge of the
plaintiff, who was employed for no definite period, procured
by the union on the ground that he was no longer a member
of the union, gave the plaintiff no cause of action against
the union. However, in Berry v. Donovan the contrary was
*held; and the court said that the inducement of the discharge of an employee working under a contract terminable
79 188 Mass. 353, 74 N. E. 603, 604 (1905).
80 Op. dt. supra note 72.
81 166 Ark. 255, 266 S. W. 84 (1924). Accord: Mills v. U. S. Printing Co.,

op. cit. supra note 64.
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at will was actionable as an inducement of the breach of a
contract.8 2 It is submitted by one authority 88 that ih view
of these Massachusetts decisions anent union liability for
inducing breaches of employment contracts the labor unions
in that state, after negotiating a trade agreement for a closed
shop, resort to the subterfuge of having the employer first
discharge all his workers, then negotiate the agreement in its
binding form, then have the employer reemploy union men
only.. This artifice obviates any possible action for inducing
a breach of an employment contract since the parties apt
to claim injury by the operation of the closed shop agreement are discharged beforehand.
There remains the final discussion of the validity of the
closed shop agreement under the National Industrial Recovery Act, Section 7-A. The closed nonunion shop is clearly barred by the Act by operation of clause two of the labor
section: ".

.

. no employee and no one seeking employment

shall be required as a condition of employment to join any
company union or to refrain from joining, organizing or
assisting, a labor organization of his own choosing..." Leaders of industry have contended that the closed union shop
is similarly barred under the spirit of the Act. Unfortunately,
the latter view of the matter is a mere opinion and is entitled only to that much credence. It is to be regretted that
there is no express declaration in the Act itself as to whether the closed union shop was intended to be barred along
with the closed nonunion shop. Some evidence of the underlying intent of the framers of the Act may be gleaned from
the Congressional history of the Bill. In the first draft
of Section 7-A as it came. from the Senate to the House Ways
and Means Committee, the closed union shop was clearly
forbidden since the clause then provided that "no employee
and no one seeking employment shall be required as a condition of employment to join any organization." It was at
82

For full discussion of the subject see Sayre, Inducing Breach of Contract,

36 HARv. L. REv. 663 (1923).
83 LANDis, CASES ON LABOR LAW 378, footnote.
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the express request of President Green of the American Federation of Labor that the phrase "company union" was substituted for the word "organization" by the House Committee.84 Mr. Green there said:
".... we suggest that you substitute the words 'company union' for
the word 'organization' . .. It is the opinion of the representatives of
the American Federation of Labor that this amendment would make
clear and definite the real meaning and purpose of this part of the
Act."

As a result of the House amendment there is nothing in the
Act itself which expressly states that an employee or a candidate for employment shall not be required as a condition

of employment to join a labor union, that is, nothing which
would automatically make the closed, union shop invalid.
The first Administrator of the National Industrial Recovery
Act, however, intimated that the Act does make the closed
union shop unlawful when he said:
"If an employer should make a contract with a particular organization to employ only members of that organization, especially if that
organization did not have 100% membership among his employees,
that would in effect be a contract to interfere with his workers' freedom of choice of their representatives or with their right to bargain
individually and would amount to employer coercion on those matters
which is contrary to the law." 85

In contrast to this theory, however, it might be pointed out
that the Houde case "majority rule" decision 8a really renders the majority legally capable of bargaining for all of the
84

Hearings before the House Committee on Ways and Means, May 18-20,

1933, p. 117. See FEDERAL TRADE AND INDUSTRY SERVIcE § 6003.
85 Exerpt from address by the Administrator, Official Release, No. 625, Sept.
4, 1933, p. 14. See FEDERAL TRADE AND INDUSTRY SERVICE § 5803.

See conversation between Senator Wagner and Mr. Lewis relative to the
closed shop, in Hearings before the House Committee on Ways and Means, May
18-20, 1933, p. 115; FEDERAL TRADE AND INDUSTRY SERVICE § 5807.
Cf. Joint statement of Johnson and Richberg: "The words 'open shop' and
'closed shop' are not used in the law and cannot be written into the law....
These words have no agreed meaning and will be erased from the dictionary of
the N. R. A. . . ." FEDERAL TRADE AND INDUSTRY SERVICz § 5802.
86
In re Houde Engineering Corp., Nat. Labor Relations Board, Sept. 1,
1934, Official Release § 141, FEDEAL TRADE AND INDUSTRY SERVIC- § 8384 (Held,
negotiation with an association representing the minority group of employees in
addition to the union chosen by the majority may constitute a violation of Sec-

tion 7-A.).
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employees and thus lays the perfect foundation for a closed
union shop made up of the employee-members of that union.
That, however, is but the view of the National Labor Relations Board and as such it lacks that judicial sanction of a
court of law. The only legal adjudication on the subject
under the National Industrial Recovery Act to date is the
New York Supreme Court case of Farullav. Ralph A. Freundlich, Inc.,87 where, in August, 1934, the court held as to
the collective bargaining agreement in question:
"The agreement, in so far as it provides for a 'closed shop,' does
not violate the law as a monopoly. The amended complaint ... states
that about 75 per cent. of the manufacturers in the industry in New
York City have signed--48 in number out of 64, employing about
2,000 workers out of about 2,650. Under the circumstances it cannot
be said that the agreement is per se illegal. It does not violate section
7 (a) of the National Industrial Recovery Act ... The act was never

intended to take away any of the rights of labor which it had acquired
after decades of struggles and conflict. The section merely provides that
no employee and no one seeking employment shall be required as a
condition of employment to join any company union or refrain from
joining, organizing, or assisting a labor organization of his own choosing.
It was enacted to strengthen the arm of labor in collective bargaining
with capital. It sought to prevent recourse to subterfuge by employers
who were able to dominate their own unions. The plaintiff is not a
company union. There is no other rival labor union. .

.

.The,'closed

shop' was upheld as legal before the National Industrial Recovery Act.
Surely Congress had no intention of declaring it illegal in 1933 when
the act was passed; and it did not so declare it."

In the second part of the same case, handed down three
months after the preliminary decision quoted above, the
court cited the leading common law decisions 88 upholding
the validity of closed shop agreements and concluded:
"In section 7 (a) we have reached the rubicon of industrial relations. If 7 (a) is sustained, better relations between employer and
employee may go forward. If it is nullified, that progress may be temporarily halted. If it is to be used as a fort, behind which either side
may retire every time a situation arises not entirely to its liking, its
passage instead of being a benefit will be a detriment to the rights of
everybody. In interpreting it, therefore, great care must be taken to
87
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consider the evils at the time it was intended to remedy, and whether
the remedy is constitutional. It is not part of the duty of this court
to say whether the act is or is not perfeot. But the court knows of
no more courageous piece of legislation ever adopted- or more appropriate to such a pressing emergency. If employers after, all the
laborious investigation by an impartial arbitrator can violate their
agreement and his findings on the ground that the agreement is in
violation of 7 (a) of the National Recovery Act ... then the unions
could likewise break their solemn contract. This would cause a chaos
of uncertainty which would result in great damage, not only to employers and employees, but to the whole public. It would be a throwback to the lawless days which it has been the prime object of the
National Industrial Recovery Act to abolish, and it is unthinkable
that the Congress which passed the act had any such idea."8 9

This concludes the examination into the legal status of the

collective bargaining agreement. The siibject has so many
ramifications that it is literally impossible to set down with
any degree of certainty the exact legal situation that the
collective bargaining agreement is destined to occupy in
the future. The increased importance of collective bargaining under the new system is bound to lead to an abundance of litigation on the point, and this litigation will without a doubt take the form of an examination into the judicial" treatment of the- question in the past. Out of it all will
be inevitably chrystallized some definite conception of the
collective agreement as a legal document, and then, it is
hoped, the legal scales will strike a happier balance. For the
nonce it is sufficient to leave the question with the remark
that the subject has judicial and extrajudicial connotations
which are of vast importance to our modern society. Once
collective bargaining agreements are signed they become
the "law" of the parties -to them; once -the specific agreement is adjudicated it becomes a part of the law of trade and
industry; and the latter is the governing force behind the
production of the bread and butter of'a great nation.
Henry Clay Johnson.
Washington, D. C.
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